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Abstract
We analyze the AI alignment problem. This
is the problem of aligning an AI’s objec-
tive function with human preferences. This
problem has been argued to be critical to AI
safety, especially in the long run. But it has
also been argued that solving it robustly is
extremely challenging, especially in highly
complex environments like the Internet. It
seems crucial to accelerate research in this
direction.
To this end, we propose a preliminary
research program. Our roadmap aims
to decompose alignment into numerous
more tractable subproblems. Our hope is
that this will help scholars, engineers and
decision-makers to better grasp the upcom-
ing difficulties, and to foresee how they can
best contribute to the global effort.
“Solving the value-loading problem is a research
challenge worthy of some of the next generation’s best
mathematical talent.” Nick Bostrom (2014).
1 Introduction
As AI is being deployed, concerns have been raised
about the possible side effects of its implementation,
e.g. in terms of fairness, privacy, filter bubbles, po-
litical polarization, misinformation, job displacement
or even existential risks [Bos14, RDT15, Teg17]. It
has been argued that, in the long run, the only way
to robustly prevent any undesirable side effect is to
align the objective function of AIs with human prefer-
ences1. In other words, AIs should (at least partially)
want what we would like them to want. This is the
AI alignment problem.
Unfortunately, alignment is notoriously difficult,
and little research has addressed it so far. It is not
even clear how to best tackle it. In this paper, we
introduce a roadmap to better identify some of the
key steps towards robust alignment. We hope to lay
a useful groundwork to reliably guarantee that the
behavior of large-scale AIs will not have highly un-
desirable consequences. While much of our work is
speculative, we believe that several of the proposed
ideas will be critical to guarantee AI safety. More
importantly, we hope that our roadmap will help AI
experts and non-experts to better estimate how they
can best contribute to AI alignment problem.
One crucial point of our approach is that it should
be as compatible as possible with state-of-the-art AI
architectures that are, and that will be, developed
by private companies. In fact, ideally, we should
come up with an algorithmic solution that any private
group can easily plug into its AI architecture to align
it with minimal effort. This is what our roadmap
aims at.
The rest of the paper is divided into three sections.
In Section 2, we shall discuss the importance of align-
ment. In particular, we argue that today’s best way
to do good may be to work on alignment, with a few
short-term existential-risk exceptions like biological
or war risks. In Section 3, we present the main tech-
nical challenges. We also propose a roadmap to solve
1There are major caveats to this claim which shall be dis-
cussed later on
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them. Finally, in Section 4, we shall discuss non-
technical challenges, which include funding, training,
lobbying, communication, collaborative work, and so
on.
2 Alignment as a priority
Debates about AI safety are unfortunately extremely
polarized. Much focus has been given to extreme
views. This is unhelpful. Arguably, much of the dis-
agreement is due to the great uncertainty about the
future and about the pace of AI progress. In this
section, based on experts’ opinions and further con-
siderations, we shall not argue that human-level AI
is imminent. Instead, we shall argue that it is unrea-
sonable to completely discard the possibility that AI
might reach human-level within a decade. In fact, it
seems reasonable to assign at least a 1% probability
on the fact that human-level AI might be there by
2025.
This is not much. However, since this paper is
about safety, we must not base our reasoning on the
average or median prediction. Safety is about worst
or near-worst case. And a 1% probability is definitely
hugely concerning. This is why we argue that, even if
human-level AI is not very likely in the near future,
solving AI safety still is a priority. This is particularly
true given that any partial solution will almost surely
take years to set up.
This conclusion about human-level AI will be our
main argument for the urgent need of alignment re-
search. However, we shall also present arguments
that apply to today’s AIs. In particular, we shall
argue that today’s recommender systems have large-
scale side effects that indirectly cause thousands of
deaths and the neglectedness of major issues, like cli-
mate change.
2.1 Predictions about AI progress
There are many disagreements on AI progress. There
are even disagreements on what the experts believe
about AI progress. Yet, data on experts’ opinions
have been collected both in [Bos14] and [GSD+17].
The predictions about AI reaching human-level are
graphically represented by Figure 1. This human-
level threshold is defined by [GSD+17] as “when un-
aided machines can accomplish every task better and
more cheaply than human workers”.
Please note that an AI does not actually need to
reach human-level to be a major concern. It has been
argued that it suffices for it to outperform humans at
AI research to become a major threat, especially if
unaligned. In fact, it may even suffice that it out-
performs humans at long-term strategic planning in
complex environments.
In any case, when it comes to predicting the time-
line of AI progress, clearly, experts disagree. Some
believe that AI will almost surely reach human-level
within 25 years, while others believe that it is unlikely
to do so by the end of the century. It is thus presomp-
tuous to make any definite claim on AI progress, nor
on what the experts claim about AI progress.
Having said this, there are important take-aways.
First, while many experts believe that AI will not
reach human-level within this century, the majority
of them seems to believe that it will. In fact, accord-
ing to most AI experts, it seems relatively likely that
the youngest among us will be living with human-
level AI at some point.
Second, and more importantly for our purpose
here, it is notable that a majority of AI researchers
assign a non-negligible probability to human-level AI
within a decade. In fact, in the 2012 survey of
[Bos14], the median AI expert assigns a 10% prob-
ability to human-level AI by 2022. Similarly, the
2016 “aggregate forecast” by [GSD+17] assigns a 10%
probability to human-level AI by 2025.
This is extremely worrying. Human-level AI
should be able to better understand intelligence
than AI researchers, which means that it could self-
improve at a much faster rate than the rate at which
current AI research progresses. As a result, there
seems to be a nonnegligible probability that we may
observe an “intelligence explosion” within a decade.
Now, evidently, experts are not entirely reliable.
AI research is still shrowded with the souvenir of
failed predictions of the past. Back in 1970, Mar-
vin Minsky asserted: “In from three to eight years
we will have a machine with the general intelligence
of an average human being.” He turned out to be
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Figure 1: Experts’ predictions on human-level AI from [GSD+17].
deeply mistaken.
However, while there were periods during which
AI experts definitely underestimated the challenges
of AI research, this overoptimism should not be gen-
eralized. In fact, it seems that, lately, AI researchers
have rather been underestimating the pace of AI
progress. Indeed, in [GSD+17], the median AI ex-
pert predicted that AIs would need another 12 years
to reach human-level at the game of Go. Again, AI
experts were deeply mistaken, as AlphaGo reached
human-level only a few months after the survey.
Besides, as explained by the author of the survey
Katja Grace [WG18], AI experts do not seem to have
spent much time thinking about their answers. In-
deed, the mere way the question was phrased induced
a bias in AI experts’ answers. The survey [GSD+17]
should thus not be regarded as very reliable.
But such failures of AI experts should not make
us more confident in the fact that AI will not reach
human-level in a near future. Au contraire, they
should be regarded as an added uncertainty. But
added uncertainty, e.g. larger variance, usually in-
creases the probability of extreme scenarios. Thus,
arguably, based on the survey and on experts’ bi-
ases, we should assign at least a 10% probability on
human-level AI by 2025. If not sooner.
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2.2 Accelerating progress of AIs
Discussions about AI progress date back to the early
days of the theory of computing. Stanislaw Ulam
quoted John von Neumann saying that “the acceler-
ating progress of technology [...] gives the appear-
ance of approaching some essential singularity in the
history of the race beyond which human affairs, as
we know them, could not continue” [Ula58]. This
observation has been echoed by several scholars, in-
cluding I.J. Good, Vernor Vinge [Vin93], and other
more recent personalities like Ray Kurzweil, Stephen
Hawking, Elon Musk and Bill Gates.
The basis of their argument is simple. Technolo-
gies are critical to make better technologies. As a re-
sult, better technologies allow for faster technological
progress, which allows for even better technologies,
which allow for even faster technological progress,
and so on. This phenomenon is well-known to be
captured by Moore’s law [Moo65] in hardware devel-
opment. But it should not be regarded as specific to
hardware. The observation is more general. Better
technologies accelerate technological progress, even
in, say, software development (think about Tensor-
Flow for instance). And this seems to inevitably lead
to an exponential (if not superexponential) progress.
Unfortunately, we humans are arguably quite poor
at having an intuitive understanding of such expo-
nential growths. It seems that we tend to underesti-
mate its effect on a longer term. This is evidenced by
the fact that tales about exponential growth, such as
the “wheat and chessboard problem”, are often said
to be extremely counter-intuitive. Our inability to
foresee the speed of exponential growth should count
as a warning about our inability to foresee that of
technology progress.
It is often argued that a corollary of such obser-
vations is that technological progress cannot go on
forever. This is precisely why some argue that it
will reach some “singularity”. Having said this, it
seems that the main ultimate hurdle to technolog-
ical progress is to be found in the laws of physics.
Yet, technologies are arguably still extremely far from
the limits of physics. There is still a lot of room
for improvement. For one thing, we do know of a
rather limited machine that performs at human-level,
namely, the human brain. It seems unreasonable to
claim with absolute certainty that a large-scale ma-
chine that is optimized for intelligence and computa-
tion will never outperform the human brain.
2.3 The complexity of AIs
Now, assuming that human-level AI will eventually
come to being, when will this happen? To have a
more informed guess of a likely answer to this ques-
tion, it is useful to go back to Turing’s 1950 seminal
paper that started AI research [Tur50].
Turing argued that the main bottleneck to human-
level AI was the programming of the complexity of
intelligence. He postulated that the complexity of
human-level intelligence was likely of the same order
of magnitude as the number of synapses in the human
brain. Back in 1950, estimates of this number were
between 1010 and 1015. Turing then argued that, as
a result, perhaps 109 bits of program were critical
to reach human-level intelligence. These days, the
number of synapses is rather estimated to be around
1015 [Dra05]. This should increase our estimate of
the needed size of AIs to reach human-level.
As of 2017, it seems that the largest AI systems
were around 1011 bits long [SMM+17]. This means
that we are not that far from AIs whose complexity is
comparable to the human brain’s. Given the current
pace of progress, it seems quite believable that by
2025, the complexity of AIs will exceed that of the
human brain — perhaps by far. By then, AIs will
also likely be able to access much more data than
our human brains could ever hope to process within a
lifetime. Thus, an argument similar to Turing’s seems
to suggest that human-level AI may be reachable by
2025.
While it is often argued that arguments along the
lines of Turing’s are somewhat oversimplifications of
the complexity and subtleties of human-level intelli-
gence, it is noteworthy that stunning progresses have
been made by mostly increasing the processing capa-
bilities of AIs and the size and quality of their training
datasets. In fact, OpenAI [RWC+19] concluded their
2019 paper on their breakthrough in natural language
as follows: “When a large language model is trained
on a sufficiently large and diverse dataset it is able to
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perform well across many domains and datasets”.
2.4 Recent progress
In the last few years, AI research has yielded numer-
ous outstanding results that have often been labeled
as “surprising”, including by AI experts. Most no-
table is AlphaGo’s breakthrough in the game of Go.
But in fact, the list of unexpected progresses in AI is
itself surprisingly long. Let us only mention a few of
them.
Figure 2 displays the progress in image synthesis.
In particular, in 2017, [KALL17] have been able to
produce images that are now hard to distinguish from
actual photos. Their technology relies on so-called
generative adversarial networks (GANs), which allow
for the better analysis and understanding of high-
dimensional inputs. The following year, the same
research group [KLA18] made dramatic improvement
by designing higher resolution photorealistic images.
Most importantly, whereas only a few hand-picked
images of 2017 were indeed photorealistic, essentially
all of the images of 2018 were so2.
Another spectacular advance was that of Google
Duplex [LM18], in 2018. Google Duplex is an assis-
tant that can call and make reservations for haircut or
restaurants. Its performances are hugely impressive.
They are arguably indistinguishable from a compe-
tent human assistant.
Finally, let us mention the fact that the creation
and optimization of seed AIs has been automated
by [ZL17] in 2017. In some sense, we thus already
have self-improving AIs, as these AIs are able to solve
problems by creating AIs that are improvements of
themselves. In particular, the automated AI design
of [ZL17] outperforms humans’ designs of AIs.
Such advances in AI are noteworthy because, ac-
cording to many, they are surprising. This means
that, if AI experts had to guess how long it would take
for these AIs to outperform humans at their respec-
tive tasks before finding out that they already could,
most of them would have been wrong. Such AI ex-
perts would have been underestimating AI progress.
Bayesian inference tells us that, as a result, we
2See thispersondoesnotexist.com
should update our beliefs. Everytime we are sur-
prised by AI progress, we should decrease our predic-
tion of the date of human-level AI emergence. The
fact that the last few years yielded a large number
of surprising AI breakthroughs means that we should
expect human-level AI sooner than we did a few years
ago.
2.5 Concrete problems in AI safety
This paper is evidently not the first to raise concern
about AI safety. However, much of the concern so far
seems to mostly boil down to fault tolerance. In par-
ticular, [AOS+16] list 5 imaginable failures that AIs
should be taught to be robust against. These are neg-
ative side effects, reward hacking, scalable oversight,
safe exploration and distributional shift. Similar no-
tions are also discussed in [LMK+17], who further
propose environments to test pratical solutions.
The failures studied by [AOS+16] mostly concern
aspects of an AI agent that the designer may not
have anticipated. This is a general principle. It is
often extremely hard to foresee how a system will be
behaving in practice. This quote by Turing [Tur50]
is particularly relevant to understand this:
The view that machines cannot give rise to
surprises is due, I believe, to a fallacy to
which philosophers and mathematicians are
particularly subject. This is the assump-
tion that as soon as a fact is presented to
a mind all consequences of that fact spring
into the mind simultaneously with it. It is
a very useful assumption under many cir-
cumstances, but one too easily forgets that
it is false. A natural consequence of doing
so is that one then assumes that there is
no virtue in the mere working out of conse-
quences from data and general principles.
We should not overestimate our ability to foresee
the aftermaths of launching a human-level AI.
2.6 Control is insufficient
On the other hand, [OA16] have proposed to allow
for safe interruption of misbehaving AIs. This is a
5
Figure 2: Progress in using GAN to create ex nihilo realistic pictures.
difficult problem, since an AI may learn when it is
likely to be interrupted to avoid (or aim at) interrup-
tions. Note that its desire to be, or to avoid being, in-
terrupted could be motivated by its optimizing goal.
Typically, if interruptions drive it away from rewards,
then it will want to avoid interruptions. The concept
of safe interruptibility has then been generalized by
[EMGHM17] to interacting agents.
Another approach to interruptibility consists of re-
liance on the AI’s uncertainty about its goal, as op-
posed to the interrupting agent who may better know
this goal. This setting corresponds to so-called off-
switch games between the interrupting agent and the
AI, see e.g. [HMDAR16]. Because of its uncertainty
about its goal, the AI may go wrong. The challenge
is for the AI to analyze correctly its uncertainty, as
well as the interrupting agent’s ability to take over
the AI’s job, so as to determine when the AI should
be switched off, rather than acting according to its
possibly flawed belief on the agent’s utility function.
Such approaches are particularly suited for ad-
dressing the control problem. This is the problem
of maintaining human control over AIs.
However, the solutions proposed by [OA16] and
[EMGHM17] are arguably limited. Namely, they pro-
pose to constrain the AIs’ learning algorithms. Yet,
especially if there is a race between competing compa-
nies or countries to construct useful AIs, such safety
concerns may be regarded as too costly to be im-
plemented. They may thus be discarded by AI de-
signers. In other words, it seems necessary to supply
other potential solutions to AI safety.
Besides, for [OA16, EMGHM17] to be relevant, it
is necessary to assume that some (human?) agent is
able to control the AI and to prevent potential harms
caused by the AI. Meanwhile, [HMDAR16] assume
that the (human?) agent will be able to take over
the AI’s job if needed. In practice though, large-scale
AIs such as recommender systems are processing so
much data that the surveillance or replacement of
such AIs is arguably unfeasible, at least by humans.
What is more, if an AI becomes superintelligent, then
it will likely believe it can perform a better job than
the interrupting agent, especially if these interrupting
agents are humans. In fact, more generally, relying
on humans to guarantee AI safety is probably not a
good idea.
2.7 Humans are liabilities
In many systems, humans can be argued to be the
bottleneck of safety. Humans can be easily mistaken,
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inattentive, drunk, sleepy, angered, influenced, black-
mailed and threatened, e.g. through autonomous
weapons (see [oLI15]). We tend to prefer defending
our loved ones, which may be viewed as a weakness
that a malicious attacker or AI may take advantage
of. As a result, AI safety will likely need to avoid
reliance on humans.
Note that this is not specific to AI safety. Typ-
ically, this is already assumed to hold for crypto-
graphic security. The less we rely on humans, the
safer our systems. This is why it seems crucial to
design systems that can guarantee their own safety.
Perhaps even despite human intervention.
2.8 Byzantine environments
What makes large-scale AI safety particularly chal-
lenging is the fact that the environment of such AIs
is extremely complex, dynamic and often adversarial.
In particular, if an AI interacts with a malicious envi-
ronment, this environment might make the AI choose
morally bad decisions. See e.g. [Pri16].
Some research has already been done in this direc-
tion, under the name of adversarial learning [LM05,
SVK17]. One problem faced by this line of work is
robustness to so-called evasion attacks. While neural
networks often classify correctly most inputs, there
is often an imperceptible modification to a correctly-
classified input that will turn it into a misclassified
one [BCM+13, GMF+18]. This may have major con-
sequences, e.g. if a terrorist uses such attacks to es-
cape surveillance.
Another problem addressed by adversarial learning
is poisoning attacks. This is when an AI is fed with in-
correctly labeled inputs during training, which may
be provided by some adversary. If the AI is inter-
acting with its environment, and if the environment
contains adversaries (which it usually does), the AI’s
learning may then be completely upset by a few mod-
ifications of the environment. This is discussed by
[BEMGS17, MGR18, DEMG+18].
More generally, complex environments are ex-
tremely hard to handle. As an example, YouTube’s
recommender system is interacting with billions of
users whose behaviors are hard to predict. In such
systems, it is usually extremely hard to know if a
video suggestion is desirable or not. This may de-
pend on the user’s background knowledge and emo-
tional state. As an extreme example, while videos on
suicide methods may be generally harmless, suggest-
ing them to some people in some contexts is arguably
morally inacceptable.
2.9 Incentives
Today’s individual and moral incentives in developing
and deploying AIs are huge. Massive cost reduction
and greater service can be provided by companies
using AIs. Thousands, if not millions, of lives can be
saved by the deployment of AIs in healthcare. And
the same holds for self-driving cars.
Given this, it is likely to be extremely hard to slow
down the progress and deployment of AIs. What
is more, any discussion that demands significant in-
creased costs and delays will likely be mostly dis-
carded. This will be even more so if such discussions
sound unilateral. No one from country X will want
to stop AI deployment while country Y is not.
This is why it is important to provide pragmatic,
scalable, easy-to-implement and not-too-costly solu-
tions for AI safety. Evidently, this poses huge addi-
tional constraints for AI safety researchers. But this
is why alignment really needs the “best mathematical
talents”.
2.10 Proxies won’t do it
The reason why alignment will probably not be solved
easily is because measuring the desirability of a de-
cision is a hard problem itself, especially if this de-
sirability score is turned into an objective function.
In particular, indicators are usually extremely bad
variables to optimize [O’N16].
This principle is brilliantly captured by what has
become known as Goodhart’s law: “When a measure
becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.”
This problem is absolutely not specific to AIs. Think
about grades in educational systems. What they are
based on incentivizes students to study “for the ex-
ams”, which then incentivizes teachers to teach “for
the exams”. Especially if teachers are then scored by
their students.
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Similarly, metrics like GDP, profit, Shanghai rank-
ing, h-index or number of followers have completely
upset the behavior of governments, companies, uni-
versities and Twitter users. While such metrics per-
haps used to be relevant indicators, their use as tar-
gets have greatly nullified their relevance. They have
led to all sorts of hacking strategies, e.g. p-hacking
in the academic world.
The same is likely to hold for AIs. Any proxy is
likely to be hacked by AIs in some undesired and un-
foreseen manner. This is why it is of the utmost im-
portance that AIs be sufficiently aligned with what
we humans roughly deem as desirable.
2.11 AIs can go terribly wrong
Many scholars have raised major concerns about exis-
tential risks posed by AIs [SB08, Yud08, Bos14]. The
classical scenario is that of an AI with a misdirected
goal, e.g. maximizing paperclips or click rates. Such
an AI would then have the incentives to redirect all
of mankind’s economy towards the sole purpose of
optimizing its objective function. If humans become
a hurdle to the AI’s goal, then the AI will want to
get rid of humans to accomplish its goal.
Yet, it seems likely that, at least in the long run,
the main threat to a powerful AI is the emergence of
an even more powerful AI with a diverging objective
function. Any powerful AI may then want to delete
all such threats. And one way for it to do this may
be to prevent any further development of mankind.
More generally, even when the AI does not pur-
posely want to do harm, it is likely that its path
towards achieving its goals will not be aligned with
mankind’s safety. In particular, it can be argued that
for most objective functions, it will be instrumen-
tally useful for the AI to set itself some intermediary
objectives, such as, goal-preservation, self-protection,
self-replication, self-improvement and resource acqui-
sition.
This phenomenon is called instrumental conver-
gence. Note that it is not specific to AI. If you want to
do a lot of good, you too should probably take care
of your health, read a lot to improve, and acquire
money and influence.
This observation led [Bos14] to dub doom the de-
fault scenario. If no effort is spent on solving or
implementing alignment, mankind may very well be
doomed. Unfortunately, a large amount of efforts
might also be insufficient.
2.12 Discussing preferences is hard
What makes the challenge of implementing alignment
especially difficult is that discussing preferences is al-
ready hard enough among humans. We humans tend
to quickly disagree even when we actually agree, es-
pecially when it concerns politics or religion [Hai12].
It should be said that the alignment problem is
not about programming some perfect moral to AIs.
Rather, it should be regarded as the problem of en-
coding an objective function that is good enough.
This is already an extremely difficult and challeng-
ing task. In fact, it may be even more complicated,
once an AI will be approaching human-level and a
greater proportion of the population feels that this
AI’s objective function will determine the future of
mankind.
It is somehow both a curse and a blessing that not
much focus is currently given to AIs’ objective func-
tion. Of course, the trouble is that we lack the man-
power to solve alignment reliably, and the influential
power to encourage AI developers to program align-
ment. But on the bright side, it also means that we
do not yet have to face irrational political controver-
sies, nor administrative burdens to work and make
great advance on this problem.
This is an additional reason why we should actively
work on alignment as soon as possible. It is much
better to come up with a ready-to-work solution while
we can serenely and calmly work on it, and before this
turns into a political debacle.
2.13 Alignment would solve many
other problems
Finally, it is noteworthy that solving the alignment
problem will likely solve many other problems. First,
this is clearly the case in the presence of human-level
AI. Indeed, a human-level AI will be more effective
at solving any problem than we humans could. Thus,
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any problem that we care about would then be bet-
ter solved by an aligned human-level AI, than if we
tried to solve it without AI. This evidently includes
poverty, world hunger, disease, existential risks, en-
vironmental problems, biodiversity, animal suffering,
injustice, discrimination, privacy, and so on. In fact,
as argued by [Teg17], without human-level AI, in the
long run, because of existential risks like asteroid col-
lision or pandemics, mankind is doomed.
Now, arguably, solving the alignment problem
could still be extremely useful even in the absence
of human-level AI. Indeed, this would allow the de-
sign of a system that highlights the most pressing
issues. It would allow us to better allocate funds and
resources to optimize our philanthropic actions. In
some sense, solving alignment is essentially achiev-
ing the purpose of the effective altruism movement
[Sin15].
Better yet, today’s large-scale recommender sys-
tems have an enormous widespread influence on bil-
lions of individuals. Surprisingly, since 2016, there
have been more views on YouTube than searches on
Google [Des18], most of which have been suggested
by YouTube’s recommender system. Aligning it, as
opposed to letting it maximize watch-time, could al-
low to nudge a very large audience in a positive way,
e.g. by motivating them to think critically or by rais-
ing awareness of climate change issues — as opposed
to regularly exposing them to polarized misinforma-
tion as is often the case today [VRA18].
This is why we argue that, even if AI safety is of
no concern to you, alignment nevertheless should be.
In fact, with or without AI, if you want to do good,
it seems that addressing the alignment problem is
perhaps the most impactful way to go.
3 The roadmap
In this section, we shall present a roadmap for align-
ment. Note that the Future Of Life Institute pro-
posed another roadmap, which may contain other
useful perspectives on alignment3, while, interest-
ingly, [Soa15, SF17] proposed literature reviews of
important ideas relevant to alignment.
3https://futureoflife.org/landscape/
One particularity of our roadmap is that it aims
at covering the entire design of an aligned AI. It is
arguably a roadmap for end-to-end alignment. We
argue that this is critical for safety. Indeed, any sys-
tem is only as robust as its weakest part. Yet, by
only tackling identified safety problems, we expose
ourselves to blind spots. We shall do our best here to
avoid such shortcomings.
Unfortunately, our roadmap here will still be full
of gaps and false good ideas. Our purpose is not to
propose a definite perfect solution. We aim at pre-
senting a sufficiently good starting point for others
to build upon. Our approach consists of identifying
key steps in the design of an aligned AI. For the clar-
ity of exposition, these steps will be personified by 5
characters, called Alice, Bob, Charlie, Dave and Erin.
Roughly speaking, Erin will be collecting data from
the world, Dave will use these data to infer the likely
states of the world, Charlie will compute desirabil-
ity scores of the likely states of the world, Bob will
derive incentive-compatible rewards to motivate Al-
ice to take the right decision, and Alice will optimize
decision-making. This is summed up by Figure 3.
Figure 3: We propose to decompose alignment into
5 key steps: data collection, world model inference,
preference learning, incentive design and reinforce-
ment learning. We hope that such subproblems are
sufficiently independent to be tackled separately.
Evidently, Alice, Bob, Charlie, Dave and Erin need
not be 5 different AIs. Typically, it may be much
more computationally efficient to merge Charlie and
Dave. Once again, our purpose here is not to propose
a ready-to-work architecture design. We aim at un-
derlining critical steps in the design of safe, efficient
and robustly aligned AI.
3.1 Alice’s reinforcement learning
It seems that today’s most promising framework for
large-scale AI is that of reinforcement learning. In
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reinforcement learning, an AI can be regarded as a
decision-making process. At time t, the AI observes
some state of the world st. Depending on its inner pa-
rameters θt, it then takes (possibly randomly) some
action at.
The decision at then influences the next state of
the world and turns it into st+1. The transition from
st to st+1 given action at is usually considered to be
nondeterministic. In any case, the AI then receives
some reward Rt that depends on st, at and st+1. The
internal parameters θt of the AI may then be updated
into θt+1 depending on previous parameters θt, action
at, state st+1 and reward Rt.
Note that this is a very general framework. In fact,
we humans are arguably subject to this framework.
At any point in time, we observe new data st that
informs us about the world. Using an inner model of
the world θt, we then infer what the world probably
is like, which motivates us to take some action at.
This may affect what likely next data st+1 will be
observed, and may be accompanied with a reward-
ing (or painful) feeling Rt, which will motivate us to
update our inner model of the world θt into θt+1.
What might be more controversial is to argue that
this is all we do. But note that this question is irrel-
evant to us, since we focus on AIs. Not on humans.
In any case, this framework seems to be the most
promising framework for AIs interacting with a com-
plex environment.
For expository purpose, let us call Alice the AI in
charge of performing this reinforcement learning rea-
soning. Alice can thus be viewed as a maximization
algorithm, which inputs observed states st and re-
wards Rt, and undertakes actions at.
Such actions will probably be mostly of the form
of messages sent through the Internet. This may
sound benign. But it is not. If the AI is in con-
trol of 3D-printers, then a message that tells it to
construct killer drones to cause a genocide would be
catastrophic.
Note though that, as opposed to all other compo-
nents, in some sense, Alice is the real danger. She
is the only one that takes actions, in the sense that
only her actions will be unconstrained (although oth-
ers highly influence her decision-making and are thus
critical as well).
As a result, it is of the utmost importance that
Alice be well-designed. Some of the past work
[OA16, EMGHM17] have focused on the learning al-
gorithm, i.e. the update rule of θt+1 as a function
of (θt, at, st+1, Rt). However, as argued previously,
it might be too costly to restrict the learning rules
of AIs. Perhaps more interesting are the ideas pro-
posed by [AOS+16] to make reinforcement learning
safer, especially using model lookahead. This essen-
tially corresponds to Alice simulating many likely sce-
narii before undertaking any action. More generally,
Alice faces a safe exploration problem.
Even then, though, this may be insufficient, as ex-
amplified by the paperclip-maximizer example. To
make sure that Alice will want to behave in a morally
acceptable manner, it seems critical to at least par-
tially control the observed state st+1 and the reward
Rt. Note that this is similar to the way children are
taught to behave. We do so by exposing them to
specific observed states, by punishing them when the
sequence (st, at, st+1) is morally bad, and by reward-
ing them when the sequence (st, at, st+1) is morally
good.
It is probably not a good idea to constrain Alice’s
observed state st. Indeed, to avoid blind spots and
unforeseen side effects, it seems desirable for an influ-
ential AI to gather as much (relevant) data as possi-
ble. In any case, in the sequel, we shall assume that
Alice’s observed state is unconstrained. In particular,
we shall assume that she has access to all of Erin’s
data, and does inference similar to Dave’s.
Whether or not Alice’s observed state is con-
strained, her received rewards Rt are clearly criti-
cal. These rewards are her incentives, and will thus
determine her desires and her decision-making. Un-
fortunately, determining the adequate rewards Rt to
be given to Alice is an extremely difficult problem. It
is, in fact, the heart of the alignment problem. Our
roadmap to solve it identifies 4 key steps incarnated
by Erin, Dave, Charlie and Bob.
3.2 Erin’s data collection problem
In order to do good, it is evidently crucial to be given
a lot of reliable data. Indeed, even the most bril-
liant mind will be unable to know anything about the
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world if it does not have any data from that world.
This is particularly true when the goal is to do good,
or to make sure that one’s action will not have po-
tentially catastrophic consequences.
Evidently, much data is already available on the
Internet. It is likely that any large-scale AI will have
access to the Internet, as is already the case of rec-
ommender systems such as those of YouTube, Face-
book, Google, Amazon or Microsoft. However, it is
important to take into account the fact that the data
on the Internet is not always fully reliable. It may
be full of fake news, fraudulent entries, misleading
videos, hacked posts and corrupted files.
It may then be relevant to invest in more reli-
able and relevant data collection. This would be
Erin’s job. Typically, Erin may want to collect eco-
nomic metrics to better assess needs. Recently, it
has been shown that satellite images combined with
deep learning allow to compute all sorts of useful eco-
nomic indicators [JBX+16], including poverty risks
and agricultural productivity. It is possible that the
use of still more sensors can further increase our ca-
pability to improve life standards, especially in devel-
oping countries.
To guarantee the reliability of such data, cryp-
tographic and distributed computing solutions are
likely to be useful as well, as they already are on the
web. In particular, distributed computing, combined
with recent Byzantine-fault-tolerant consensus algo-
rithms like Blockchain [Nak08] or Hashgraph [Bai16],
could guarantee the reliable storage and traceability
of critical information.
Note though that such data collection mechanisms
could pose major privacy issues. It is a major
current challenge to balance the usefulness of col-
lected data and the privacy violation they inevitably
cause. Some possible solutions include differential
privacy [DR+14], or weaker versions like generative-
adversarial privacy [HKC+17]. It could also be pos-
sible to combine these with more cryptographic so-
lutions, like homomorphic encryption or multi-party
computation. It is interesting that such cryptographic
solutions may be (essentially) provably robust to any
attacker, including superintelligence4.
4Here, we assume that P 6= NP . Also, note that the possi-
3.3 Dave’s world model problem
Unfortunately, raw data are likely to be extremely
messy, redundant, incomplete, unreliable, poisoning
and even hacked. To tackle these issues, it is nec-
essary to infer the likely actual states of the world,
given the data collected by Erin. This will be Dave’s
job.
The overarching principle of Dave’s job is probably
going to be some deep representation learning. This
corresponds to determining low-dimensional repre-
sentations of high-dimensional data. This basic idea
has given rise to today’s most promising unsuper-
vised machine learning algorithms, e.g. word vectors
[MCCD13], autoencoders [LHY08] and generative ad-
versarial networks (GANs) [GPAM+14].
Given how crucial it is for Dave to have an un-
biased representation of the world, much care will
be needed to make sure that Dave’s inference will
foresee selection biases. For instance, when asked to
provide images of CEOs, Google Image may return
a greater ratio of male CEOs than the actual ratio.
More generally, such biases can be regarded as in-
stances of Simpson’s paradox [Sim51], and boil down
to the saying “correlation is not causation”. It seems
crucial that Dave does not fall into this trap.
In fact, data can be worse than unintentionally
misleading. Given how influential Alice may be, there
will likely be great interest from a large number of ac-
tors to bias Erin’s data gathering, and to thus fool
Dave. It seems extremely important that Dave an-
ticipate the fact that the data he was given may be
purposely biased, if not hacked. Like any good jour-
nalist, Dave will likely need to cross information from
different sources to infer the most likely states of the
world.
This inference approach is well captured by the
Bayesian paradigm [Hoa18]. In particular, Bayes rule
is designed to infer the likely causes of the observed
data D. These causes can also be regarded as theo-
ries T (and such theories may assume that some of
the data were hacked). Bayes rule tells us that the
reliability of theory T given data D can be derived
formally by the following computation:
ble use of quantum computers may require postquantum cryp-
tography.
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P[T |D] = P[D|T ]P[T ]
P[D]
.
Importantly, Bayes rule tells us that we should not
fully believe any single theory. This simply corre-
sponds to saying that data can often be interpreted
in many different mutually incompatible manners. It
seems important to reason with all possible interpre-
tations rather than isolating a single interpretation
that may be flawed.
When the space of possible states of the world is
large, which will surely be the case of Dave, it is of-
ten computationally intractable to reason with the
full posterior distribution P[T |D]. Bayesian meth-
ods often rather propose to sample from the posterior
distribution to identify a reasonable number of good
interpretations of the data. These sampling meth-
ods include Monte-Carlo methods, as well as Markov-
Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) ones.
In some sense, Dave’s job can thus be regarded as
writing a compact report of all likely states of the
world, given all the data collected by Erin. It is an
open question as of what language Dave’s report will
be in. It might be useful to make it understandable by
humans. But it might be too costly as well. Indeed,
Dave’s report might be billions of pages long. It could
be unreasonable or undesirable to make it humanly
readable.
One last interesting aspect to discuss is the fact
that Erin and Dave are likely to gain cognitive ca-
pability over time. It is surely worthwhile to antici-
pate the complexification of Erin’s data and of Dave’s
world models. It seems unclear so far how to do so.
But it sounds reasonable to assume that some high-
level (purely descriptive) language to describe world
models is needed, and that this high-level language
will have to be able to be reshaped and redesigned
over time. This may be dubbed the world descrip-
tion problem. It is arguably still a very open and
uncharted area of research.
As discussed above, another approach could be to
more directly merge Dave’s job with Charlie’s.
3.4 Charlie’s desirability scoring
Given Dave’s world models, Charlie’s job will then
be to compute how desirable the world is. This is
known as the value learning problem [Soa16]. This is
the problem of scoring different states of the world ac-
cording to their desirability. These desirability scores
can then serve as the basis for any agent to take de-
sirable actions.
A common approach is to compute or impose an
explicit list of desirable features. However, such an
approach may have flaws. For one thing, it strongly
relies on the ability of the list designer to figure out
all desirable features. Yet it is likely that the designer
will have blind spots, as he will probably not be able
to foresee all plausible use cases of AIs. Another limi-
tation of this approach is that the list of features may
be surprisingly constraining, as illustrated by Arrow’s
impossibility theorem [Arr50]. This theorem asserts
that the only way to aggregate the preferences of a
group of individuals so as to guarantee both unanim-
ity5 and independence of irrelevant alternatives6 is
dictatorship. Finally, a list of desirable features will
most likely lead to endless debates. A more princi-
pled approach seems desirable.
We argue that one promising approach may be to
have AIs learn what we humans deem desirable. Un-
fortunately, determining even a very rough approx-
imation of what, say, the median human considers
desirable is an extremely difficult problem. Again, it
should be stressed that we should not aim at deriv-
ing an ideal moral, as this is likely to be a hopeless
endeavor. Rather, we should try our best to make
sure Charlie’s desirability scores are good enough to
avoid catastrophic outcomes, e.g. world destruction,
global sufferance or major discrimination.
One proposed solution to infer human preferences
is so-called inverse reinforcement learning [NR+00,
ESG16]. Assuming that humans perform reinforce-
ment learning to choose their actions, and given ex-
amples of actions taken by humans in different con-
5This means that if everyone prefers a to b, then the group
preference should put a ahead of b.
6This means that if an individual does not change his pref-
erence between a and b, then the group preference should not
change its ordering of a over b.
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texts, inverse reinforcement learning infers what were
the humans’ likely implicit rewards that motivated
their decision-making. Assuming we can somehow
separate humans’ selfish rewards from altruistic ones,
inverse reinforcement learning seems to be a promis-
ing first step towards inferring human preferences
from data. There are, however, many important con-
siderations to be taken into account, which we discuss
below.
First, it is important to keep in mind that, despite
Dave’s effort and because of Erin’s limited and pos-
sibly biased data collection, Dave’s world model is
fundamentally uncertain. In fact, as discussed previ-
ously, Dave would probably rather present a distribu-
tion of likely world models. Charlie’s job should be
regarded as a scoring of all such likely world models.
In particular, she should not assign a single number
to the current state of the world, but, rather, a dis-
tribution of likely scores of the current state of the
world. This distribution should convey the uncer-
tainty about the actual state of the world. Besides,
as we shall see, this uncertainty is likely to be crucial
for Bob to choose incentive-compatible rewards for
Alice adequately.
Another challenging aspect of Charlie’s job will be
to provide a useful representation of potential human
disagreements about the desirability of the current
state of the world. Human preferences are diverse
and may never converge. This should not be swept
under the rug. Instead, we need to agree on some
way to mitigate disagreement.
Note, though, that this problem is absolutely not
specific to agreement on the desirability of different
states of the world. In its most general form, this is
actually a problem of social choice, that is, a prob-
lem of aggregating the preferences of a group of dis-
agreeing people into a preference of the group that,
in some sense, fairly well represents the individuals’
preferences. Unfortunately, social choice theory is
plagued with impossibility results, e.g. Arrow’s the-
orem [Arr50] or the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
[Gib73, Sat75]. Again, we should not be too demand-
ing regarding the properties of our preference aggre-
gation. Besides, this is the path taken by social choice
theory, e.g. by proposing randomized solutions to
preserve some desirable properties [Hoa17].
One particular proposal, known as majority judg-
ment [BL11], may be of particular interest to us here.
The basic idea of majority judgment is to choose
some deciding quantile q ∈ [0, 1] (often taken to be
q = 1/2). Then, for any possible state of the world,
consider all individuals’ scoring of that state. This
yields a distribution of human scores for the state of
the world. Majority judgment then concludes that
the group’s score for the state of the world is the
quantile q of this distribution. If q = 1/2, this basi-
cally corresponds to the score chosen by the median
individual of the group.
Now, to avoid an oppression of a majority over
some minority, it might be relevant to choose a small
score of q, say q = 0.1. This would mean that Char-
lie’s assigned score to a state of the world will be less
than a number v, if more than 10% of the people
believe that this state is of a score less than v. But
evidently, this point is very much debatable. It seems
unclear so far how to best choose q.
While majority judgment seems to be a promis-
ing approach, it does raise the question of how to
compare two different individuals’ scores. It is not
clear that a score v = 5 given by John has a meaning
comparable to Jane’s v = 5. In fact, according to a
theorem by von Neumann and Morgenstern [NM44],
within their framework, utility functions are only de-
fined up to a positive affine transformation. More
work is probably needed to determine how to scale
different individuals’ utility functions appropriately,
despite previous attempts in special cases [HSZ16].
Again, it should be stressed that we should not aim
at an ideal solution; a workable reasonable solution
is much better than no solution at all.
Now, arguably, humans’ current preferences are
almost surely undesirable. Indeed, over the last
decades, psychology has been showing again and
again that human thinking is full of inconsistencies,
fallacies and cognitive biases [Kah11]. We tend to
first have an instinctive reaction to stories or facts
[Blo16], which quickly becomes the position we will
want to defend at all costs [Hai12]. Worse, we are
unfortunately largely unaware of why we believe or
want what we believe or want. This means that our
current intuitions are unlikely to be the preferences
we would have, if we were more informed, thought
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more deeply, and tried to make sure our preferences
were as well-founded as possible.
To better understand this, a thought experiment
may be useful. Let us imagine better versions of us.
By thinking more carefully, or by learning new in-
formation, each current me could then improve and
become a better version. Let us call it a me+. Each
me+ would arguably better than current me. It seems
fair to argue that it will have a better judgment than
current me. This is the fundamental claim that we
should build upon.
The superiority of me+ over current me can be
illustrated by the fact that past preferences are of-
ten no longer regarded as desirable. Our intuitions
of slavery, homosexuality and gender discrimination
have been completely upset over the last century, if
not over the last few decades. It seems unlikely that
all of our other intuitions will never change. In par-
ticular, it seems unlikely that me+ will fully agree
with current me. And it seems reasonable to argue
that me+ would be “more right” than current me.
Now, why stop at me+? By the same argument,
it seems that a me+ of the me+ is still better. In
fact, by taking this argument to its limit, we see that
each current me’s judgment should arguably be re-
placed by an infinite me+. Call it me++. A me++
is what current me would desire, if current me were
smarter, thought much longer about his or her prefer-
ences, and analyzed all imaginable data of the world.
Arguably, me++ has a better judgment than current
me.
These remarks motivated Eliezer Yudkowsky to in-
troduce the concept of coherent extrapolated volition
[Yud04]. The basic idea is that we should adopt the
preferences that future versions of ourselves would
eventually adopt, if they were vastly more informed,
had much more time to ponder their preferences and
tried their best to be better versions of themselves.
In some sense, instead of making current me’s de-
bate about what ought to be (which often turn into a
pointless debacle), we should let me++’s debate. In
fact, since me++’s supposedly already know every-
thing about other me++’s, there is actually no point
in getting them to debate. It suffices to aggregate
their preferences through some social choice mecha-
nism. This is the preference aggregation problem.
Such ideas may seem very foreign and quite in-
tractable. But in 2018, [NGA+18] introduced a
voting-based system to solve variants of the infamous
trolley problem [Foo67] for self-driving cars. Their
approach can be argued to be a form of coherent
extrapolated volition. Indeed, by analyzing users’
inputs to the moral machine experiment [ADK+18],
they reconstructed likely coherent preferences of the
surveyed users, and then extrapolated such prefer-
ences to new moral dilemmas. More research along
these lines is surely desirable.
It is noteworthy that we clearly have epsitemic
uncertainty about me+’s and me++’s. Determining
me++’s convictions may be called the coherent ex-
trapolation individual volition problem. Interestingly,
this is (mostly) a prediction problem. But it is def-
initely too ambitious to predict them with absolute
uncertainty. Bayes rule tells us that we should rather
describe these convictions by a probability distribu-
tions of likely preferences [Eck19].
Such preferences could also be approximated us-
ing a large number of proxies, as is done by boost-
ing methods. The use of several proxies could avoid
the overfitting of any proxy. Typically, rather than
relying solely on DALYs [O+09], we probably should
use machine learning methods to adequately combine
a large number of similar metrics, especially those
that aim at describing other desirable economic met-
rics, like human development index (HDI) or gross
national happiness (GNH). Evidently, much more re-
search is needed along these lines.
Computing the desirability of a given world state
is Charlie’s job. In some sense, Charlie’s job would
thus be to remove cognitive biases from our intu-
itions of our own preferences, so that they still ba-
sically reflect what we really regard as desirable, but
in a more coherent and informed manner. This is
an incredibly difficult problem, which will likely take
decades to sort out reasonably well. This is why it is
of the utmost importance that it be started as soon
as possible. Let us try our best to describe, infor-
mally and formally, what better versions of ourselves
would likely prefer. Let us try to predict the volition
of me+’s and me++’s.
This attempt is likely going to be shocking to us
all. Indeed, we should expect that better versions
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of ourselves will find desirable things that the cur-
rent versions of ourselves find repelling. Unfortu-
nately though, we humans tend to react poorly to
disagreeing preferences. And this is likely to hold
even when the opposing preferences are our better
selves’. This poses a great scientific and engineering
challenge. How can one be best convinced of the pref-
erences that he or she will eventually embrace but
does not yet? In other words, how can we quickly
agree with better versions of ourselves? What could
someone else say to get me closer to my me++? This
may be dubbed the individual judgment improvement
problem.
To address this issue, [ICA18] have discussed the
possibility of setting up a debate between opposing
AIs. In particular, they asked whether a human judge
would be able to lean towards the better AI for the
right reasons. Interestingly, such a debate might al-
low for significantly more powerful “proofs of superi-
ority” than monologues, at least if the analogy with
the so-called “polynomial hierarchy” of complexity
theory holds.
Such considerations are particularly critical for the
alignment problem as it will likely be a key challenge
to build trust in the systems we design. But evi-
dently, this is more general question that should be
of interest to anyone who desires to do good.
3.5 Bob’s incentive design
The last piece of the jigsaw is Bob’s job. Bob is
in charge of computing the rewards that Alice will
receive, based on the work of Erin, Dave and Charlie.
Evidently he could simply compute the expectation
of Charlie’s assigned scores for the likely states of the
world. But this is almost surely a bad idea, as it
opens the door to reward hacking.
It is important to keep in mind that Alice’s goal
is to maximize her discounted7 expected future re-
wards. But given that Alice knows (or is likely to
7Note also that this discount rate is also a subject of con-
tention. In essence, it is about how to compare the far future to
the near future. One approach to determine this discount rate
may be to learn it from human preferences, typically through
a coherent extrapolated volition. Note also that it may worth
having different discount rates for different sorts of reward sig-
nals.
eventually guess) how her rewards are computed, in-
stead of undertaking the actions that we would want
her to, Alice could hack Erin, Dave or Charlie’s com-
putations, so that such hacked computations yield
large rewards. This is sometimes called the wirehead-
ing problem.
Since all this computation starts with Erin’s data
collection, one way for Alice to increase her rewards
would be to feed Erin with fake data that will make
Dave infer a deeply flawed state of the world, which
Charlie may regard as ideal. Worse, Alice may then
find out that the best way to do so would be to
invest all of Earth’s resources into misleading Erin,
Dave and Charlie. This could be extremely bad for
mankind.
This is why it is of the utmost important that Al-
ice’s incentives be (partially) aligned with Erin, Dave
and Charlie performing well and being accurate. This
will be Bob’s job. Bob will need to make sure that,
while Alice’s rewards do convey Charlie’s scores, they
also give Alice the incentives to make sure Erin, Dave
and Charlie perform as reliably as possible the job
they were given. In fact, it even seems desirable
that Alice be incentivized to constantly upgrade Erin,
Dave and Charlie for the better. Ideally, she would
even want them to be computationally more powerful
than herself, especially in the long run.
Unfortunately, it does not seem straightforward to
see how Bob can make sure that Alice has such in-
centives. Perhaps a good idea is to penalize Dave’s
reported uncertainty about the likely states of the
world. This source of uncertainty may have numer-
ous causes. First, it may be caused by the lack of
sufficiently reliable data. Bob should thus make sure
Alice’s rewards are affected by the reliability of Erin’s
data. The more reliable Erin’s data, the larger Alice’s
rewards.
Second, it may be caused by Dave’s incorrect in-
ferences. Unfortunately, Dave’s correctness may be
hard to estimate. One way is to introduce an adver-
sary AI in charge of testing Dave, as is done in Gen-
erative Adversarial Networks (GANs). But it could
also be interesting to compare Dave’s computations
to a (computationally infeasible) baseline provided by
the rigorous Bayesian computation. More generally,
Dave should try to be aware of the reliability of his
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inferences. And the more reliable Dave’s inference,
the larger Alice’s rewards should be.
Third, like Erin and Dave, Charlie should try to
compute the uncertainty about her computations.
Again, when she feels that her estimations are un-
reliable, Bob should take note of this and adjust Al-
ice’s rewards accordingly to motivate Alice to provide
larger resources for Charlie’s computations.
Also, the communications between Erin and Dave,
between Dave and Charlie, and between Charlie and
Bob may be bottlenecks. Indeed, communication
has a limited bandwidth. Increasing this bandwidth,
as well as the compression and decompression algo-
rithms to optimize what can be communicated is a
difficult problem. Bob should make sure that they
should be done correctly. The better these commu-
nications, the larger Alice’s rewards should be.
Now, Bob should also mitigate the desire to re-
trieve more reliable data and perform more trustwor-
thy computations with the fact that such efforts will
necessarily require the exploitation of more (compu-
tational) resources, probably at the expense of Char-
lie’s desirability scores. It is this non-trivial trade-off
that Bob will need to take care of.
Bob’s work might be simplified by some (partial)
control of Alice’s action or world model. Although
it seems unclear so far how, techniques like interac-
tive proof (IP) [Bab85, GMR89] or probabilistically
checkable proof (PCP) [ALM+98] might be useful to
force Alice to prove its correct behavior in a compu-
tationally tractable manner. Indeed, by requesting
such proofs to yield large rewards, Bob may incen-
tivize Alice’s transparency. Bob may even incentivize
Alice to upgrade more often Bob rather than herself,
so that Bob remains computationally more powerful
than Alice. All such considerations make up Bob’s
incentive design problem.
It may or may not be useful to allow Bob to switch
off Alice if need be. It should be stressed though
that interruptibility is a difficult challenge, as dis-
cussed by [OA16, EMGHM17, MEH16, HMDAR16,
HMRAD16, WBC+17] among others. In fact, safe
interruptibility seem to require very specific circum-
stances, e.g. Alice being indifferent to interruption,
Alice being programmed to be suicidal in case of po-
tential harm or Alice having more uncertainty about
her rewards than Bob being able to take over Al-
ice’s job. It seems unclear so far how relevant such
circumstances will be to Bob’s control problem over
Alice8. Besides, instead of interrupting Alice, Bob
might prefer to guide Alice towards preferrable ac-
tions by acting on Alice’s rewards. This is somewhat
what is proposed by [RH19] to solve interruptibility.
On another note, it may be computationally more
efficient for all if, instead of merely transmitting a
reward, Bob also feeds Alice with “backpropagating
signals”, that is, information not about the reward
itself, but about its gradient with respect to key vari-
ables, e.g. Charlie’s scores or Erin’s reliability. Hav-
ing said this, we leave open the technical question of
how to best design this.
3.6 Decentralization and heuristics
We have separated the alignment problem into 5 com-
ponents for the sake of exposition. However, it is
probably worthwhile to actually decompose it into
many more modules to take advantage of the reliabil-
ity and scalability of decentralization. In other words,
instead of having a single Alice, a single Bob, a sin-
gle Charlie, a single Dave and a single Erin, it seems
crucial to construct multiple Alices, Bobs, Charlies,
Daves and Erins.
Such a decentralization is key to fault-tolerance.
Indeed, a single computer doing Bob’s job could crash
and leave Alice without reward nor penalty. But if
Alice’s rewards are an aggregate of rewards given by
a large number of Bobs, then even if some of the
Bobs crash, Alice’s rewards will still mostly remain
the same.
Note though that crash-tolerance is likely to be in-
sufficient. Instead, we should design Byzantine-fault
tolerant mechanisms to perform the aggregation of
Bobs’ rewards, that is, mechanisms that still per-
form correctly despite the presence of hacked or ma-
licious Bobs that would want to upset Alice’s behav-
ior. Byzantine-fault tolerance might be best guar-
anteed by estimators with large statistical break-
downs [LR+91], e.g. (geometric) medians and vari-
ants [BEMGS17].
8Note though that this may be very relevant assuming that
there are several Alices, as will be proposed later on.
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Evidently, in this Byzantine environment, cryp-
tography, especially (postquantum?) cryptographi-
cal signatures and hashes, are likely to play a critical
role. Typically, Bobs’ rewards will likely need to be
signed, so that Alice will not be able to design fake
Bobs to feed her with infinite rewards. More gener-
ally, the careful design of secure communication chan-
nels between the components of the AIs seems key.
This may be called the secure messaging problem.
Another difficulty is the addition of more power-
ful and precise Bobs, Charlies, Daves and Erins to
the pipeline. It is not yet clear how to best inte-
grate reliable new comers, especially given that such
new comers are likely to be constructed by Alice, and
may thus be malicious. In fact, they may want to
first appear benevolant to gain admission. But once
they are numerous enough, they could take over the
pipeline and, say, feed Alice with infinite rewards.
This is the upgrade problem, which is discussed by
[CSA18]. Perhaps the code of new Bobs, Charlies,
Daves and Erins should be open, and an AI should
be in charge of testing these new AIs to make sure
that they do not have some sort of back door cre-
ated by Alice. Approaches based on interpretability
of machine learning [CDH+16, DVK17, NCH+18] or
on program verification [HKWW17, GGG17, KL18]
may be particularly helpful here. But this upgrade
problem seems to mostly be an unchartered area of
research.
Now, in addition to reliability, decentralization
may also enable different Alices, Bobs, Charlies,
Daves and Erins to focus on specific tasks. This
would allow to separate different problems, which
could lead to more optimized solutions. To this end,
it may be relevant to adapt different Alices’ rewards
to their specific tasks. Note though that this could
also be a problem, as Alices may enter in competition
with one another like in the prisoner’s dilemma. We
may call it the specialization problem. Again, there
seems to be a lot of new research needed to address
this problem.
3.7 When to assign the moral burden?
Another important point to address is the extent to
which interacting AIs should be made to react to
Bobs’ rewards. Typically, if a small company creates
its own AI, should this AI be subject to our alignment
framework?
It should be noted that being subject to Bobs’ re-
wards may be computationally very demanding, as
it may be hard to separate the signal of interest to
the AI from the noise of Bobs’ rewards. In fact, it
seems crucial to make sure that any AI with an objec-
tive function can be easily plugged into our alignment
roadmap, typically by simply being given Bob’s re-
wards (and backpropagating signals) in addition to
the rewards it was initially programmed to receive.
But then comes the problem of the scaling of Bob’s
rewards.
Intuitively, the more influential this AI is, the more
it should be influenced by Bobs’ rewards. But even if
this AI is small, it may be important to demand that
it be influenced by Bobs, as, otherwise, there may
be some diffusion of responsibility, i.e. many small
AIs that disregard moral concerns on the ground that
they each hardly have any global impact on the world.
Another potential challenge is the fact that an AI
may gain computational capability and influence over
time. If no alignment is prepared for this AI, it
might eventually become an unaligned human-level
AI, which may be catastrophic. Thus, it seems cru-
cial that even basic, but potentially unboundedly self-
improving9, AIs be given at least a seed of align-
ment. This may be called the moral burden assign-
ment problem.
Figure 4 recapitulates the different subproblems of
our roadmap for the alignment problem.
4 Non-technical challenges
As discussed, the alignment problem poses a large
number of technical challenges that will likely re-
quire years, if not decades, of interdisciplinary collab-
orations. Such large-scale projects usually raise nu-
merous non-technical challenges that will also require
great manpower. It is probably worthwhile to men-
tion them to stress the fact that it is definitely possi-
ble to greatly contribute to the global effort to solve
9In particular, nonparametric AIs should perhaps be
treated differently from parametric ones.
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Figure 4: We propose to decompose alignment into 5 steps. Each step is associated with further substeps
or techniques. Also, there are critical subproblems that will likely be useful for several of the 5 steps.
the alignment problem without doing AI research.
4.1 Gain respectability
Unfortunately, these days, discussions about AI
safety are plagued by what Nils Nilsson dubbed the
respectability bias [Bos14]. Because of a long-standing
poor track record in AI predictions, any reasoning
about AI progress is often labeled as nonsense and
dismissed as irrelevant. Worse, critics often isolate
and mock the weirdest of all singularitarians’ claims,
as though it was representative of all discussions
about human-level AIs.
Again, it should be stressed that the relevance of
the alignment problem does not require the certainty
of achieving human-level AI. Even if there is only a
1% chance that AI will reach human-level within the
next decade, this still is a vastly greater probabil-
ity than a collision with a large asteroid. Yet, deny-
ing this 1% chance seems quite presumptuous, espe-
cially given the poor track record of AI predictions.
Human-level AI should thus be taken extremely seri-
ously.
Besides, even if human-level AI is not regarded
as probable nor worrysome, as argued in Section 2,
alignment will surely have many great applications.
In its global form, it is about taking a more global
view at the world to better identify the most critical
actions to undertake to do good. You do not need to
care about human-level AI to find this useful.
For research on alignment to really take off, it
seems extremely important that this line of work no
longer be regarded as foolish nonsense. It needs to be-
come respectable to publicly claim that one is working
on alignment. Alignment must become a mainstream
field of research.
There are many possible actions to take to make
this happen. It seems that the most important ac-
tion is to publicly take position in favor of research on
alignment, whether it is in papers, conferences, me-
dias, podcasts, YouTube, Twitter or in blogs. But
we need to be careful about distinguishing justifi-
able concerns about human-level AI from religious-
sounding poorly grounded variants. It is extremely
important to be pedagogical, charitable and convinc-
ing about why the possibility human-level AI must
be taken seriously.
4.2 Improve debating
It seems quite clear that today’s main hurdle to tak-
ing alignment seriously is that we humans are very
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poor at debating. Many prefer to show how ridicu-
lous some ideas of some singularitarians are than to
take the possibility of human-level AI seriously.
Part of the reason why we debate poorly is that we
often replace virtuous debating by virtue signaling,
especially when it comes to moral debates. We often
try to stress our goodness, rather than to contribute
constructively. This is a poor reflex that we all need
to work on. We need to promote better debating.
Another recurrent cause of poor debating is over-
confidence, which makes us inattentive to opposing
sides’ remarks. In fact, Johnson and Fowler write
that “humans show many psychological biases, but
one of the most consistent, powerful and widespread
is overconfidence” [JF11]. It seems crucial to raise
awareness about this flaw of ours, and to promote
more careful thinking.
Evidently, there are many other aspects of poor
debating that should be addressed, but we will not
go into further details here. It should be stressed,
however, that improving critical thinking and qual-
ity debating seems to be a major priority towards
promoting, and thus solving, the alignment problem.
4.3 Funding and recruiting
Given the stakes of the alignment problem and the
challenges it poses, it seems crucial that many more
people get involved in the effort than is the case to-
day. To make great progress in alignment, it is nec-
essary to develop larger funding structures, as well as
to attract talents from different areas.
To search for fundings, it seems essential to raise
awareness of the importance of alignment within and
beyond academic spheres. It may be worthwhile to
gain influence in companies and governments. Per-
haps over the years, it could even be possible to make
it a social priority. In particular, it seems to be a
good first step that Google decided to present a few
deontological principles about its AI research [Pic18].
Hopefully, others will follow.
Given that the research in alignment is still in a
very early phase, it is probably important as well
to allow for the exploration of many alternatives —
perhaps even those that do not seem promising at
first. We do not yet have solid grounds to build on.
We should thus not be to rigid about how to move
forward.
In order to attract the best and brightest, it is
probably a great idea to define as many intermediary
challenging, but solvable, problems as possible. This
is what has been done by [LMK+17]. It is surely a
priority to define different landmark problems to nur-
ture some competition between talents, as has been
done for empirical work by ImageNet [DDS+09] and
CIFAR [KH10]. To attract “mathematical talents”,
it is probably worth challenging mathematicians with
non-trivial elegant mathematical conjectures related
to AI safety, even when such conjectures are not guar-
anteed to be helpful to alignment. Perhaps some of
the numerous problems we discussed in the paper can
be turned into such conjectures.
4.4 Training
Unfortunately, tackling alignment requires a lot of
background knowledge, especially in terms of ma-
chine learning concepts. Fostering a wide community
of experts will require a lot of easily accessible educa-
tive materials. More universities probably should set
up more lectures on AI safety. And more workshops
should probably be organized.
It also seems important to reach out for manpower
beyond the traditional alleys of academia. These
days, massive online open courses have been able to
reach out to millions of students. Many similar on-
line resources have allowed many to learn the basics
of machine learning. In particular, YouTube videos
have been raising awareness and educating millions of
people with surprisingly few resources, through chan-
nels like 3Blue1Brown, Siraj Raval, Computerphile,
Robert Miles, ZettaBytes or Science4All.
Finally, a great way to learn and to make progress
is to share open source codes and open data sets.
This can also be regarded as a major step towards a
massive collaboration on today’s most pressing prob-
lems.
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5 Conclusions
This paper discussed the alignment problem, that is,
the problem of aligning AIs’ objective function with
human preferences. This is often regarded as a long-
term problem. But we argued that, even if it is likely
to be so, it should not be regarded as such. Indeed, it
seems reasonable to assign a nonnegligible probability
on the fact that human-level AI could arise within a
decade. As a result, to mitigate this near-worst-case
scenario, it seems urgent to make it a priority line of
research as of now.
The paper also presented a general roadmap to
tackle this issue. Interestingly, this roadmap identi-
fies 5 critical steps, as well as many relevant aspects
of these 5 steps. In other words, we have presented
a large number of small problems that readers are
highly encouraged to tackle. We hope that combin-
ing the solutions to these small problems could help
to partially address alignment.
Finally, we presented non-technical challenges so
that both experts and non-experts can contribute to
the global effort aside from AI research. This should
be of great interest to anyone who wishes to do good,
including many different charities and associations.
We hope to have raised awareness of the impor-
tance of alignment and of the possible paths to par-
tially solve it. Most importantly, we hope to have
convinced you that much more work, funding and
manpower is essential. And we hope that you will do
your best to contribute as much as you can.
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